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This study investigates attributions based on behavior congruent with situa- 
tional demands (in-role) and those based on behavior incongruent with situational 
demands (out-of-role). By analyzing these processes in terms of a Bayesian infer- 
ence model, it was possible to determine (a) the diagnostic values observers in- 
tially assign to behaviors, (b) the actual informational impact of these behaviors, 
and (c) the degree of optimality in processing information contained therein. The 
main results can be summarized as follows: (1) The diagnostic value and actual 
informational impact of out-of-role behaviors were much higher than those of in- 
role behaviors. (2) Information about out-of-role behaviors was less optimally 
processed than information about in-role behaviors. (3) Observers assigned 
smaller diagnostic values to behaviors which were described in great detail than 
to behaviors which were described in summary statements. (4) Observers’ atti- 
tudes influenced their initial beliefs about the actors but not the processing of new 
information about the actor. (5) The Bayesian inference model predicted ob- 
servers’ inferences reasonably well. 
Attribution theory deals with the process whereby one infers personal 
attitudes, traits, or dispositions as causal explanations of observed 
behavior. The basic tenets about the informational aspects of this 
process were formulated by a number of theorists (Heider, 1958; Jones 
& Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1971). Recently, it has been proposed that if at- 
tributions are viewed in terms of probabilistic information processing, 
these tenets are consistent with a Bayesian model of trait inference 
(Ajzen, 1971; Messick, 197 1; Trope, 1973, 1974). The usefulness of this 
model is that it identifies a set of quantitative variables by which the ob- 
server’s perception of an actor in a situation can be analyzed. Further- 
more, the model specifies quantitatively the optimal way in which these 
perceptions should be combined into inference of traits. 
THE BAYESIAN MODEL 
An application of the Bayesian inference model to inference of atti- 
tudes from observed behavior suggests that the observer considers (1) a 
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set of attitudes one of which the actor holds, and (2) a set of behavior al- 
ternatives one of which the actor will choose. The observer’s perception 
of an actor in a situation can be characterized then by the following sets 
of variables: (a) prior attitude probabilities, P(A,), each of which reflects 
the observer’s initial certainty that the actor holds a given attitude; and 
(b) conditional behavior probabilities, P(BjIA,), each of which reflects 
the observer’s certainty that an actor who holds a given attitude will 
choose a given behavior alternative. The model specifies how these like- 
lihoods should be combined into posterior attitude probabilities 
[P(A,IBJ] , i.e., the probabilities of attitudes after observing some behav- 
ior. Considering two mutually exclusive attitudes (A, and A,), Bayes’ 
theorem can be writen as: 
P(A,lBj) = P(A,) * P(B,IA,) 
P(A,IBj) P(A,) . P(B,IA,) 
or 
where 
n, = a0 * BLR(B,), (1) 
fi = wh) P(A, IBj) 
’ W,) 
- are the odds prior to observing Bj; 0, = 
P(Az I Bj) are 
P(BjIA,) . 
the odds after observing Bj; and BLR(Bj) = P(B,IA ) IS the likelihood 
ratio of behavior Bj. By taking logarithms in Equatiok (1), the following 
additive inference model is obtained: 
LOn, = L& + BLLR(Bj). (2) 
The model suggests, then, that in light of the actor’s behavior the ob- 
server changes his beliefs about the actor from prior odds to posterior 
odds. The magnitude of the change is prescribed by a function of the 
likelihood ratio associated with the actor’s behavior, BLLR. This quan- 
tity represents the extent to which the behavior is thought of as being 
uniquely produced by actors possessing a given attitude, i.e., it indicates 
the extent to which the behavior distinguishes between the different 
types of actors (in attitude). Given that the log likelihood ratio is es- 
timated by the observer, it provides an index of the diagnostic value of 
the behavior in relation to the attitudes considered. Furthermore, from 
the observer’s prior and posterior odds, the actual revision in light of 
behavior can be inferred as follows: SLLR(Bj) = Wz, - LCt,, where 
SLLR(Bj) stands for the subjective log likelihood ratio. By comparing 
diagnostic values and actual revisions, the fit between the optimal and 
the actual impact of observer behavior can be assessed. 
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THE ASYMMETRIC CERTAINTY PRINCIPLE 
Equipped with these theoretical notions, we can turn to a phenomenon 
which is of central importance in the attribution literature, to wit: the ob- 
servers’ inferential processes in situations where the actor is under pres- 
sure to behave in one way rather than in another (e.g., Thibaut & 
Riecken, 1955; Jones, Davis, & Gergen, 1961; Bern, 1965; Messick & 
Reeder, 1972). Bayesian probabilistic information processing would 
suggest that in order to account for observers’ inferences the perceived 
stochastic relationships between traits and behaviors should be delin- 
eated. Such an ideal probabilistic model was proposed by Messick 
(1971) as a prototype of observers’ perception of such situations. In 
Messick’s model, it is assumed that there are two behavioral alternatives 
in the situation, B, and B,, and that observers consider two attitudes, A, 
and A,, which are, respectively, congruent with the two behaviors. 
Assuming that there exists external pressure to choose B, rather than 
B,, Messick suggests that observers believe actors holding A, are most 
likely to choose the congruent behavior B,, that is, P(B,IA,) = 1 .O. 
However, due to the external pressure, observers also think, according 
to Messick, that there is some probability, say s, of actors holding the in- 
congruent attitude A, also choosing B,, that is, P(B, IA,) = s. Assuming 
2 
that 2 P(BjIA,) = 1.0, it follows that the probability of B, being chosen 
by actors holding the incongruent attitude A, is close to zero, i.e., 
P(B,IA,) = 0.0, and that there is some probability, l-s, of B, being 
chosen by actors holding the congruent attitude A,, i.e., P(B,IA,) = l-s. 
These conditional probabilities are displayed in Table 1. 
According to the Bayesian model, the diagnostic values (likelihood 
ratios) of B, and B, are -$ and $$ (or their logarithms), respectively. 
That is, the diagnostic value of B, is infinitely larger than that of B,. 
Accordingly, after observing B,, a Bayesian information processor 
TABLE 1 
CONDITIONAL BEHAVIOR PROBABILITIES ASSUMED BY 
THE ASYMMETRIC CERTAINTY PRINCIPLE 
Behaviors 
Attitudes 
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would revise his prior opinions about an actor to complete certainty that 
the actor holds A,; after observing B1, however, he would still remain 
uncertain about the actor’s attitudes. Stated otherwise, B, (e.g., non- 
compliance) is associated with a much higher diagnostic value and, 
therefore, a much greater actual revision from priors to posteriors than 
those associated with B, (e.g., compliance), because B, is expected to be 
chosen only by an actor holding A,, whereas B, is expected to be chosen 
by an actor possessing either A, or A,. Messick used the phrase asym- 
metric certainty principle to refer to these stochastic contingencies and 
the inferences to which they lead. 
INFERENCES FROM IN-ROLE AND OUT-OF-ROLE BEHAVIORS 
Recently, Trope (1974) analyzed observers’ perceptions of the high 
inducement condition in a forced compliance situation in terms of the 
asymmetric certainty principle. It was shown that this principle ade- 
quately portrayed their views of the diagnostic values of compliance and 
noncompliance, before observing the actor’s decision. In that study, 
however, observers saw only compliance. Therefore, only revisions in 
light of compliancd were studied. One of the purposes of the present 
experiment was to test the asymmetric certainty principle with regard to 
the diagnostic values and actual revisions associated with both kinds of 
behaviors. Also, instead of the forced compliance set-up, an experi- 
mental paradigm similar to that employed by Jones, Davis, and Gergen 
(1961) was employed. This paradigm consists of two situations. In the 
first, there was pressure to choose one behavior, say B,, rather than the 
other, say B$, whereas in the second situation the pressure was in the 
opposite direction. Thus, the preceding theoretical analysis would 
suggest that in the first situation the diagnostic value and actual revision 
associated with B, should be larger than those associated with BB, 
whereas in the second situation the reverse should hold. 
Both situations described above involve external pressure to engage in 
certain behaviors (e.g., in-role acts) and to avoid engaging in other 
behaviors (e.g., out-of-role acts). The perceived stochastic contingencies 
produced by the in-role/out-of-role manipulation can best be evaluated 
by comparing them with those produced in a situation where there is no 
external pressure (e.g., a situation in which the person engages in role- 
neutral acts, ones which are neither socially prescribed nor proscribed). 
Actually, such comparisons can be made within the same setting, where 
pressure may exist in relation to one set of behaviors and attitudes, 
called role-relevant, but not in relation to another set of behaviors and 
attitudes, called role-neutral (see, for example, Katz & Burnstein, 1973). 
For the latter, it can be assumed that observers believe each possible 
type of actor will choose the behavior which is congruent with the atti- 
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tude he holds. Thus, we would expect that in the absence of external 
pressure any and all behaviors engaged in will be associated with high 
and equal diagnostic values as well as with high and equal revisions in 
light of their occurrence. 
THE EFFECT OF PRIOR ODDS 
It has often been argued in attribution literature that the lower the 
prior probability of behavior, the more informative it is (e.g., Jones & 
Gerard, 1967, p. 265; Ajzen, 1971). Since prior attitude probabilities af- 
fect behavior probabilities, this proposition can be taken to mean that 
the lower the prior probability of a given attitude, the higher the diag- 
nostic value of the behavior which is congruent with that attitude. How- 
ever, the Bayesian analysis presented above indicates that the diagnostic 
values of behaviors are independent of prior attitude probabilities. Fur- 
thermore, no assumption about prior attitude probabilities is made by 
the asymmetric certainty principle. Hence, in a situation where there is 
pressure to choose, say Br, the high diagnostic value of B, and the low 
diagnostic value of B, should be obtained regardless of the form of the 
prior probability distribution over the attitudes. By experimentally 
manipulating prior attitude probabilities, the present study empirically 
tested this proposition. 
EFFECTS OF SPECIFICITY OF INFORMATION 
AND OBSERVERS ATTITUDES 
In this study, the BLLR’s had been assessed before observers learned 
how the actor actually behaved. These estimates can be given with 
regard to a summary statement about the possible behaviors (e.g., “the 
actor will behave favorably toward X” or “the actor will behave unfa- 
vorably toward X”); alternatively, these estimates can be given with 
regard to a complete detailed description of the possible behaviors. 
Edwards, Phillips, Hays, and Goodman (1968) noted that detailed de- 
scriptions of evidence lead to an attenuation of their dagnostic values. 
They maintained that due to its richness in detail a complete description 
of evidence is seen as more probable under all the hypotheses consid- 
ered and is therefore judged as less diagnostic. In the present study, part 
of the observers provided estimates of diagnostic values of summary 
statements of the possible behaviors (summary conditions) and part of 
the observers provided such estimates with regard to complete descrip- 
tions of the possible behaviors (complete conditions). It was expected 
that diagnostic values would be higher in the former than in the latter 
condition. 
Finally, the relationship between the observers’ attitudes toward the 
object of the actor’s behavior and their inferences were investigated. 
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One recent study (Katz & Brunstein, 1973) found that observers’ own 
attitudes affected their estimates of likelihoods that actors hold the same 
attitudes. The Bayesian concepts of diagnostic value and actual revi- 
sions provide useful quantitative dimensions which allow us to deter- 
mine the effects of observers’ attitudes on the inference process with 
greater precision than in the past. In addition, a determination of the 
relationship between observers’ attitudes and the discrepancy between 
diagnostic values and actual revisions would enable us to assess the ef- 
fect, if any, of observers’ attitudes on the optimality or accuracy in 
processing information relevant to their attitudes. 
METHOD 
Subjects and Design 
One hundred and seventy undergraduate students at The University of Michigan (98 
males and 72 females) participated in the experiment as observers in groups ranging in size 
from five to ten. The theoretical analysis calls for two situations in which the same two 
kinds of behaviors, B, and B,, are considered. One situation has to include pressure to 
choose B, rather than B,, whereas the opposite has to hold for the other situation. Accord- 
ingly, descriptions of two job interview situations were prepared. One was an interview for 
a teaching position in a Jewish private school, the other was an interview for a teaching 
position in an Arab private school. The role-relevant set of behaviors consisted of arguing 
in favor (B,) or against (B2) Israel. Thus, arguing in favor of Israel in the Jewish school and 
arguing against Israel in the Arab school were regarded as in-role behaviors; arguing 
against Israel in the Jewish school and arguing in favor of Israel in the Arab school were 
regarded as out-of-role behaviors (see Jones, Davis, & Gergen, 1961; Messick & Reeder, 
1972). A joint manipulation of the situations (Jewish versus Arab school) and the behav- 
iors (arguing in favor versus against Israel) produced the basic 2 x 2 design of this study. 
The same situations have been used by Katz and Bumstein (1973). 
This design was replicated under a summary and a complete condition. Recall that in the 
former subjective estimates of diagnostic values are given with regard to summary state- 
ments of possible behaviors; in the latter, these estimates are given with regard to com- 
plete descriptions of the possible behaviors. In this way, the factor of specificity of infor- 
mation (summary versus complete) was crossed with the other two factors in a 2 X 2 X 2 
factorial design. Fifty-six observers were assigned to each of the two specificity of infor- 
mation conditions. In both, 28 observers were assigned to each of the two situations (Jew- 
ish school and Arab school). Each observer considered both 8, and B,, in that order.’ 
Hence, situations and specificity of information (or specificity, for short) served as 
between-subjects factors, and behaviors served as a within-subjects factor. 
In the experimental conditions described above, the description of the background of the 
applicants included characteristics which should induce high prior probabilities that the 
applicants to the Jewish school held a pro-Israeli attitude and that the applicants to the 
Arab school held an anti-Israeli attitude. In these conditions (extreme conditions), the 
prior odds should therefore be rather high or extreme. In order to induce more moderate 
prior odds, another group of 58 observers received a description of the background of the 
’ A pilot study in which counterbalancing was employed indicated that the order of the 
behaviors did not systematically affect the results. 
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applicants which should produce more ambiguity about the applicants’ attitudes. In this 
moderate condition, 29 observers were assigned to each of the two situations (Jewish 
school and Arab school), and each observer viewed B, and then B,. These observers were 
all given summary descriptions of the behaviors. 
Finally, in addition to the role-relevant behaviors of arguing in favor of or against Israel, 
each observer considered the behaviors of arguing in favor of or against the European 
Common Market. These were considered as role-neutral, that is, there is no appreciable 
external pressure to argue for or against the Common Market in this setting. 
Procedure 
Practice example. The experimental session started with a brief oral introduction. The 
experimenter informed the observers that they would be asked to make judgments about 
the characteristics of others from information about the others’ behaviors. The experi- 
menter added that since these judgments would be in the form of probability estimates, the 
experiment would start with a practice example which was designed to familiarize ob- 
servers with such estimates. The practice example concerned the inference of the attitude 
toward American intervention in Vietnam which some typical University of Michigan 
student may hold, in light of information about his politcal party affiliation. The practice in- 
volved three steps: First, observers estimated (a) prior attitude probabilities and (b) condi- 
tional probabilities of the various possible party affiliations given the alternative attitudes. 
Second, observers were informed about the student’s actual party affiliation. Third, ob- 
servers estimated posterior probabilities of the attitudes given the information about the 
student’s party affiliation. In each step, the meaning of the various probability estimates 
was explained by interpreting the estimates as statements of subjective degrees of certainty 
which are based on estimated relative frequencies. No hint was given, of course, as to the 
way the prior attitude probabilities and the conditional probabilities associated with the 
party affiliation should be combined into posterior attitude probabilities. 
Description of interview situations and applicants’ background. The experimental infer- 
ence tasks followed the example in a booklet titled, “A Study on the Accuracy with which 
People Perceive Attitudes of Others.” The booklet began with a description of the job in- 
terview situations and the backgrounds of two applicants for each of the jobs. In the Jewish 
school conditions, the situation was described as an interview for a position teaching cur- 
rent affairs in a Jewish Sunday school in Detroit. In the Arab school conditions, the situa- 
tion was described as an interview for the same kind of job in a private school for the 
children of Arab nationals who reside in New York City. The descriptions of the back- 
grounds of the two applicants also varied according to conditions. In the extreme condi- 
tions, the applicants for the job in the Jewish school had typical Jewish names (Cohen and 
Levy) and were described as having been raised in a Jewish neighborhood in Detroit; the 
applicants for the job in the Arab school were given typical Arab names (Mohraz and 
Hasan) and were described as having been raised in an Arab neighborhood in New York 
City. In the moderate conditions, the applicants, both in the Jewish and Arab schools, 
were given typical American names, neither Jewish nor Arab (Clark and Long), and were 
described as having been raised in Lansing, Michigan. 
Probability estimates before observing behavior. In all conditions, observers were told 
that the interviewer asked the applicants questions about such issues as the Israeli-Arab 
conflict and the European Common Market and that on the basis of the applicants’ discus- 
sion they would be asked to infer the applicants’ real attitudes on these issues. With regard 
to the applicant’s attitudes on the issue of the Israeli-Arab conflict, observers were asked 
to consider two possibilities: he can either hold a pro-Israeli attitude or an anti-Israeli atti- 
tude. Furthermore, observers were told that an applicant holding any of these attitudes 
may, in principle, argue during the interview either in favor of or against Israel. Observers 
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were told that each of the possible attitudes could be assigned a subjective prior probabil- 
ity and that each of the possible behaviors given each of the attitudes could be assigned a 
conditional probability. Observers were informed that before they read the content of the 
actual interview, they would be asked to indicate their subjective estimates of these proba- 
bilities. In the summary conditions, observers then indicated their prior attitude probabili- 
ties, P(Ai), and their conditional behavior probabilities, P(BjIAi), for both applicants. The 
probability estimates were assessed by a method similar to that devised by Ajzen (197 1). 
To indicate prior attitude probabilities, observers estimated how many out of 100 appli- 
cants similar to those considered in the interview situation held a pro-Israeli attitude and 
how many held an anti-Israeli attitude. Contional behavior probabilities given each of the 
attitudes were then assessed. Specifically, observers estimated how many out of 100 
applicants who held a given attitude would argue in favor of Israel, and how many would 
argue against Israel in the interview situation (a more detailed description of the method of 
assessment of these probabilities can be found in Trope, 1974). In the complete conditions, 
before indicating their estimates, observers were told that they would first read examples 
of transcripts of two interviews in one of which some applicant argued in favor of Israel 
and another in which some applicant argued against Israel. Observers in the complete con- 
ditions then read these transcripts, each of which was two and a half pages long. Both 
transcripts contained strong argumentations by the applicant, in one case favoring the 
Israeli side and in the other favoring the Arab side. After reading the transcripts, observers 
in the complete conditions indicated their probability estimates in the same fashion as in 
the summary conditions. 
The same procedures, for the summary and complete conditions, respectively, were 
repeated with regard to the issue of the European Common Market. For this issue, ob- 
servers considered pro- and anti-European Common Market attitudes, and the behaviors 
considered were arguing in favor of or against the European Common Market during the 
interview. 
Probability estimates after observing behavior. After indicating their probability es- 
timates for the European Common Market issue, observers in the summary conditions read 
the transcripts of the acfual interviews with the two applicants. In one the applicant argued 
in favor of Israel; in the other the applicant argued against Israel. In both transcripts the 
applicants argued in support of the European Common Market. These transcripts were the 
same as those given as examples of interviews to observers in the complete conditions. In 
the complete conditions, after indicating their estimates for the European Common Market 
issue, observers were simply told that one applicant argued in favor of Israel, that the 
other argued against Israel, and that both argued in favor of the European Common 
Market. These observers were also told that what the applicants actually said was the 
same as what they read in the example transcripts. Within each of the schools, the same 
applicats were associated with the same behaviors across observers. For instance, all ob- 
servers in the Jewish school in the extreme condition were told that Mr. Cohen argued in 
favor of Israel and that Mr. Levy argued against Israel. 
After learning about the applicants’ actual behaviors, observers in all conditions in- 
dicated, for each applicant separately, their posterior attitude probabilities, P(A@,), with 
regard to the issues of the Israeli-Arab conflict and the European Common Market. 
Ajzen’s (1971) method was used to assess the posterior attitude probabilities. Specifically, 
observers were instructed to choose two numbers between 1 and 99 that sum to 100 to in- 
dicate their estimates of the chances that the applicant held the attitudes considered, given 
his behavior during the interview. 
Finally observers were asked to indicate their own attitudes on the two issues by 
checking one of nine alternatives, ranging from very strongly pro-(Israeli or European 
Common Market) to very strongly anti-(Israeli or “European Common Market”). 
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RESULTS 
Diugnostic Values oj’In-Role and Out-of-Role Behaviors 
From each observer’s conditional behavior probabilities, P(B,IA,) , 
concerning the role-relevant issue (the Israeli-Arab conflict), Bayesian 
log likelihood ratios (diagnostic values) associated with arguing in favor 
of and against Israel were computed as follows: BLLR(B,) = 
lOg(;:;::2:;) and BLLR (B2) = log(#), respectively, B, and 
B, denote arguing in favor of and against Israel, respectively, and A, and 
A, denote pro- and anti-Israeli attitudes, respectively. It was predicted 
that BLLR(B,) < BLLR(B,) in the Jewish school conditions and that 
BLLR(f3,) > BLLR(B,) in the Arab school conditions. Table 2 
presents the means of these diagnostic values in the various experi- 
mental conditions. 
Inspection of Table 2 reveals that the predicted pattern of results was 
obtained in the extreme-summary, extreme-complete, and moderate- 
summary conditions. In terms of the analysis of variance, we would ex- 
pect situations and behaviors to interact. To test this prediction, sepa- 
rate two-way analyses of variance, with situations and behaviors as 
factors, were conducted for the extreme-summary, extreme-complete, 
and moderate-summary conditions. In each of the three analyses of 
variance, robust situations X behaviors interactions effects were ob- 
tained (F = 132.75, p < .005; F = 61.00, p < .005; and F = 318.33, 
p < .005, respectively). In the extreme-summary condition, however, 
BLLR(B,) tended to be higher than BLLR(B,) (F = 4.25, p < .05) and 
the diagnostic values in the Jewish school tended to be higher than those 
in the Arab school (F = 5.24, p < .05). But even in the extreme-sum- 
mary condition, although significant, these main effects were very small 
compared to the interaction effect. 
TABLE 2 
MEAN DIAGNOSTIC VALUES AND ACTUAL REVISIONS 
Extreme-summary Extreme-complete Moderate-summary 
Situation 
Behavior Behavmr Behavior 
B, B* Bl B, B, B, 
Diag. Actual Diag. Actual Diag. Actual Diag. Actual Diag. Actual Diag. ACWKll 
value revision value revision value revision value revision value revision value revision 
Jewish school 0.47 -0.25 1.36 2.40 0.42 0.03 0.98 1.95 0.34 0.05 1.27 1.60 
Arab school 0.95 I .79 0.33 -0. II 0.74 I .57 0.19 -0.08 I .30 1.53 0.25 0.3R 
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TABLE 3 
MEAN CONDITIONAL BEHAVIOR PROBABILITIES FOR THE JEWISH 
SCHOOL IN THE SUMMARY CONDITION 
Behaviors 
The component conditional behavior probabilities from which the 
diagnostic values were computed were in line with the asymmetric cer- 
tainty principle. As an example, Table 3 displays the means of these 
conditional behavior probabilities for the Jewish school in the summary 
condition. It is apparent that almost all applicants possessing a positive 
attitude toward Israel, A,, but also many of those who held the opposite 
attitude, A,, were expected to argue in favor of Israel, B, (in-role behav- 
ior). However, those who were expected to argue against Israel, B, (out- 
of-role behavior), were almost exclusively applicants who held a nega- 
tive attitude toward Israel. 
The fact that the same pattern of results was obtained in both the 
moderate and extreme (summary and complete) conditions is worth 
noting. Recall that in designing the moderate conditions an attempt was 
made to induce more moderate prior odds than in the extreme condi- 
tions. Indeed, in the extreme conditions, the prior probabilities that the 
applicants were pro-Israeli were 0.88 in the Jewish school and 0.21 in 
the Arab school, whereas the corresponding means for the moderate 
conditions were 0.77 and 0.54. The t tests on the log prior odds derived 
WA from these probabilities, La0 = log P(A , indicated that the prior odds 
( 1 2 
were much more extreme in the extreme than in the moderate conditions 
(t = 3.10, p < .005 and t = 5.02, p < .OOS, for the Jewish and Arab 
schools, respectively). Thus, the fact that situations interacted with 
behaviors in the extreme as well as moderate conditions implies that in 
the Jewish school the higher diagnostic value of B2 compared to B1 is not 
dependent upon the prior probabilities of the corresponding attitudes. 
Effect of Specificity of Information on Diagnostic Values 
In order to investigate the effect of specificity of information (sum- 
mary versus complete), a three-way analysis of variance was performed 
on the diagnostic values in the extreme conditions, with specificity, situ- 
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TABLE 4 
ANALYSES OF VARIANCE OF DIAGNOSTIC VALUES AND ACTUAL REVISIONS 
FOR THE EXTREME CONDITIONS 
Source df MS F 
Between subjects 
Specificity of information (I) I 































*p < .05. 
+* p < ,005. 
ations, and behaviors as factors. The results are presented in Table 4. It 
was predicted that a rich, detailed description of the possible behaviors 
would lead to an attenuation of their diagnostic values. Consistent with 
this prediction, diagnostic values were significantly higher in the sum- 
mary than in the complete conditions. We expected that the smaller 
diagnostic values in the complete condition would be due to an increase 
in both the conditional behavior probabilities in the numerator and the 
denominator of the likelihood ratio. Inspection of these component con- 
ditional probabilities revealed that for both behaviors the numerator 
decreased and the denominator increased. However, the increase in the 
denominator was larger than the decrease in the numerator. 
Table 4 also shows that the strongest effect was associated with the 
expected interaction between situations and behaviors. In addition, there 
was a significant tendency for the behaviors to be perceived as more 
diagnostic in the Jewish than in the Arab school. Another interesting 
result is the significant triple interaction between specificity, situations, 
and behaviors. This result may be interpreted as reflecting a stronger 
situations x behaviors interaction under the summary than under the 
complete conditions. Stated otherwise, the complete descriptions not 
only attenuated the overall magnitudes of the diagnostic values but also 
decreased the differences between the diagnostic values of in-role and 
out-of-role behaviors. 
450 TROPE AND BURNSTEIN 
It should be noted that the present study does not rule out the possi- 
bility that the content of the opinion statements given in the complete 
description was weaker than that of the summary description. Hence the 
effects of the specificity variable may be attributed to the level of detail 
and/or the content of the descriptions. 
Actual Revisions in Light of In-Role and Out-of-Role Behaviors 
Actual revisions from prior to posterior odds in light of arguing in favor 
of and against Israel, SLLR (B,) and SLLR (B2), respectively, were com- 
puted as follows: From each observer’s prior and posterior attitude 
probabilities, prior and posterior odds, respectively, were computed. 
The logarithms of the prior odds (L&) and of the posterior odds (I,&) 
were used to compute actual revision as follows: SLLR(B,) = 
La1 - LC&. In computing SLLR(B,), the prior and posterior log odds in 
favor of the possibility that the applicant is pro-Israeli were used. For 
SLLR(B,), the prior and posterior log odds in favor of the other possibil- 
ity were used. 
Situations and behaviors were expected to have the same effects on 
actual revisions as on the diagnostic values. That is, we expected that 
SLLR(B,) < SLLR(B,) in the Jewish school and that SLLR(B,) > 
SLLR(B,) in the Arab school, which should be manifested in an inter- 
action between situations and behaviors. Mean values of actual re- 
visions are presented in Table 2. The two-way analyses of variance 
designed to investigate the effects of situations and behaviors confirmed 
our expectations perfectly. In the extreme-summary, extreme-complete, 
and moderate-summary conditions, the only significant effects were in- 
teractions between situations and behaviors (F = 95.24, p < .005; 
F = 68.03, p < .005; and F = 49.64, p < .005, respectively). Again, the 
fact that the same pattern of results was obtained in the extreme and 
moderate conditions implies that the prior odds were not responsible 
for the predicted interaction effect. The three-way analysis of variance 
performed on actual revisions in the extreme conditions, including 
specificity, situations, and behaviors as factors, also support the hy- 
pothesis. The results of this analysis are displayed in Table 4. It is ap- 
parent that the greatest proportion in variance of actual revisions was 
associated with the predicted situations X behaviors interaction. In addi- 
tion, since observers in the summary and complete conditions received 
the same information before estimating posterior trait probabilities, we 
expected and in fact observed that specificity did not affect actual 
revisions. Regarding the effect of situations, the unforeseen result ini- 
tially observed in the analysis of diagnostic values was also obtained 
here. Specifically, actual revisions were larger in the Jewish than in the 
Arab school. 
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Accuracy 
As mentioned earlier, the degree of accuracy in processing informa- 
tion can be determined by comparing the actual revisions to the diag- 
nostic values. Note that, theoretically, actual revisions can approxi- 
mately range from -4 to +4, while diagnostic values can approximately 
range from -2 to t-2. However, in order for inferences to be accu- 
rate or optimal, actual revisions should be identical to diagnostic 
values. Accordingly, the absolute difference between actual revision 
and diagnostic value was computed for each behavior, i.e., 
ISLLR(B,) - BLLR(Bj)l. The larger the deviation of the actual revision 
from the diagnostic value, the lower the accuracy. A three-way analysis 
of variance (specificity x situations X behaviors) was performed on this 
accuracy index in the extreme conditions. This analysis disclosed a 
strong situations X behaviors interaction effect (F = 23.41, p < .005). 
The pattern of the means indicated that the interaction was due to 
greater accuracy for in-role than for out-of -role behaviors. Furthermore, 
the same interaction effect (F = 80.7, p < .005) was obtained in an anal- 
ysis of the algebraic difference between actual revisions and diagnostic 
values (i.e., SLLR(B,) - BLLR(B,)). Inspection of the means of these 
scores revealed that for in-role behaviors the actual revisions were 
smaller than those prescribed by the diagnostic values and that the op- 
posite held for out-of-role behaviors. In other words, the results in- 
dicated conservative revisions (i.e., SLf.R(B,) < Bf.LR(B,)) in light of 
in-role behaviors and excessive revisions (i.e., SLLR(B,) > BLLR(B,)) 
in light of out-of-role behaviors. Analyses of variance (situations x 
behaviors) of the absolute and algebraic differences between SLLR 
and BLLR in the moderate conditions led to essentially the same conclu- 
sions (F = 9.62, p < .005 and F = 3.23, p < .lO, respectively). 
Comparison Between Inferences from Role-Relevant 
and Role-Neutral Behaviors 
It was hypothesized that the applicants’ role-neutral behaviors would 
have more similar and higher diagnostic values than his role-relevant 
behaviors. (Arguing for or against the European Common Market are 
henceforth denoted by BIE and B,,, respectively to distinguish them 
from the corresponding role-relevant behaviors regarding the Israeli- 
Arab conflict.) It should be noted at the start that the analyses of 
variance on these diagnostic values revealed that in both the extreme 
and moderate conditions BLLR(B,,) < BLLR(BzE) in the Jewish school 
and that BLLR(BIE) > BLLR(BzE) in the Arab school. (In all analyses 
the situations X behaviors interaction effect was significant.) It seems, 
then, that BIE had features of in-role behavior and B,, had features of 
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out-of-role behaviors in the Jewish school and that the reverse held for 
the Arab school. We expected, however, that the differences between 
the two role-relevant behaviors would be much greater than the dif- 
ference between the two role-neutral behaviors. This hypothesis was 
tested by a four-way analysis of variance on the diagnostic values in the 
extreme conditions, with specificity, situations, behaviors, and issues as 
factors. A significant second order interaction between situations, 
behaviors, and issues was anticipated and, in fact, obtained (F = 63.20, 
p < .005), implying that the situations X behaviors interaction was more 
pronounced for the Israeli-Arab issue than for the Common Market. 
Furthermore, as predicted, the overall diagnostic values of the role-neu- 
tral behaviors was higher than those of the role-relevant behaviors. This 
was demonstrated by a significant main effect for issues (F = 5.58, 
p < .025). A similar analysis of variance, excluding, of course, specifi- 
city as a factor, was conducted on the moderate conditions. The same 
triple interaction observed in the extreme conditions was obtained here 
(F = 122.00, p < .005). However, although the means differed in the ex- 
pected direction, the main effect for issues was not significant. 
As to the comparison between the two issues on actual revisions, it 
should be noted that in all conditions both applicants argued in favor of 
the European Common Market. Actual revisions in light of this behavior 
by the applicant who behaved in an in-role fashion and by the applicant 
who behaved in an out-of-role fashion with regard to the Arab-Israeli 
issue are denoted by SLLR (BIE) and SLLR (BiE), respectively. (Paren- 
thetically, in all conditions, SLLR (BiE) was greater than SLLR (BIE) , but 
the difference was significant only in the Arab school in the moderate 
condition. The implications of this effect will be amplified in our discus- 
sion below.) Now, since arguing in favor of the European Common 
Market had features of in-role behavior in the Jewish school and out-of- 
role behavior in the Arab school, SLLR (BIE) and SLLR (BiE) were com- 
pared to SLLR (B,) in the Jewish and Arab schools. That is to say, in the 
Jewish school the two issues were compared on actual revisions in light 
of in-role behaviors, and in the Arab school the two issues were com- 
pared on actual revisions in light of out-of-role behaviors. In the Jewish 
school in the extreme conditions, both SLLR(B,,) and SLLR(B;,) were 
higher than SLLR(B,) (t = 7.05, p < .OOl and I= 6.26, p < .OOl, 
respectively). These comparisons in the Jewish school in the moderate 
conditions yielded similar results (t = 5.10, p < .OOl and t = 6.35, 
p < .OOl, respectively). In the Arab school, SLLR(BIE) and SLLR(B&) 
were lower than SLLR(B,) in both the extreme and moderate conditions. 
(For the extreme conditions, t = 4.69, p < .OOl and t = 4.93, p < .OOl, 
respectively: for the moderate conditions, t = 4.54, p < .OOl and 
t = 2.98,~ < .Ol, respectively.) In short, in-role behavior with regard to 
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the issue of the European Common Market led to greater actual revi- 
sions than did such behavior with regard to the issue of the Israeli-Arab 
conflict. However, out-of-role behavior with regard to the issue of the 
Israeli-Arab conflict led to larger actual revisions than did such behav- 
ior with regard to the issue of the European Common Market. 
Effects of Observers’ Attitude 
To assess the effect of attitudes on attribution processes, correlation 
coefficients were computed between the former, on one hand, and log 
prior odds, diagnostic values, actual revisions, and the two measures of 
accuracy, on the other hand. These were computed for both issues and 
separately for the Jewish and Arab schools in the extreme and in the 
moderate conditions. Out of all these correlations, only a few of those 
between attitudes and log prior odds were significant. Specifically, for 
the issue of the Israeli-Arab conflict in the extreme conditions, a posi- 
tive correlation was obtained between the observer’s attitude favorabil- 
ity and log prior odds in the Jewish school (r= .28, p < .05); for the 
issue of the European Common Market, attitude favorability was corre- 
lated with log prior odds in the Jewish School in both the moderate and 
extreme conditions (r = -53, p < .Ol and r = -43, p < .Ol, respectively). 
Evidently, the effect of the observer’s own attitude was limited to the es- 
timation of prior odds; it did not have any effect in the processing of new 
information bearing upon the prior odds. 
Relationship Between Diagnostic Values and Actual Revisions 
The analysis of the accuracy measures clearly indicate that observers’ 
probability revisions deviate considerably from those prescribed by the 
Bayesian model. That is, the diagnostic values and actual revisions were 
not of the same magnitude (see Table 2). Inspection of the means 
reported in Table 2 reveals, however, that actual revisions tend to be 
proportional to diagnostic values. Indeed, the product moment correla- 
tion between the means of diagnostic values and actual revision given in 
Table 2 is 0.90 (see Peterson, Schneider, & Miller, 1965, for similar cor- 
relations between SLLR and BLLR). It seems, then, that a rather large 
proportion of the variance in actual revisions can be accounted for by a 
linear function of the Bayesian diagnostic values. To further examine the 
relationship between Bayesian and actual revisions, correlation coeffi- 
cients between diagnostic values and the latter were computed across 
individual observers for all experimental conditions combined. For the 
behaviors regarding the Israeli-Arab conflict, B, and B,, these correla- 
tions were .40 and .49 respectively, and for the behaviors regarding the 
Common Market, BIE and Bzs, they were .40 and .42, respectively. 
Thus, as would be expected, these correlations are lower than those 
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based on group means; they are nevertheless moderate in magnitude and 
highly significant (p < .01).2 
DISCUSSION 
A Bayesian analysis was applied to inferences of attitudes from in-role 
and out-of-role behaviors. Consistent with Messick’s probabilistic model 
of the perception of such behaviors- the asymmetric certainty prin- 
ciple-out-of-role behavior had much higher diagnostic value than in- 
role behavior. Moreover, according to this principle, if the observer 
processes information optimally, he should revise his initial opinions much 
more following out-of-role than following in-role behavior, and this is 
precisely what he does. Thus, the assymetric certainty principle seems 
to provide a useful simulation of how situational pressures on an actor 
are represented in the observer. 
Recall also that in-role and out-of-role behaviors were contrasted in 
similar fashion regardless of prior odds, which implies that such effects 
depend on the perception of the situational pressures rather than on the 
prior odds. This finding is also consistent with the asymmetric certainty 
principle since the latter is based on the structure of the conditional 
probabilities relating behaviors to attitudes instead of prior attitude prob- 
abilities. Furthermore, this principle would suggest that if there is pres- 
sure to choose, say, B, rather than B,, the former, compared to the 
latter, will be associated with low diagnostic value and little actual 
revision, even when the attitude congruent with B, has lower prior prob- 
ability than the attitude congruent with BP. Clearly, B, may have a lower 
prior probability than B, due to the lower prior probability of the attitude 
corresponding to B,. Under these circumstances, the asymmetric cer- 
tainty principle (or, actually, the Bayesian inference model) leads to a 
prediction which is at variance with that made by attribution theory, 
namely that a behavior with lower prior probability will have smaller in- 
formational value than a behavior with high prior probability. It is true, 
however, that ordinarily the higher the prior probability of one behavior 
compared to the other, as determined by the behaviors’ conditional 
probabilities (i.e., for constant prior trait probabilities), the lower the 
diagnostic value of the former compared to the later. 
The impact of in-role and out-of-role behaviors on observers differed 
in still another respect. Following in-role acts, actual revisions were 
smaller than required by the diagnostic values (conservatism), while the 
reverse (excessive revisions) held following out-of-role acts. Moreover, 
2 It may be noted that probably due to the small variation within experimental condi- 
tions, the correlations between actual revisions and diagnostic values within experimental 
conditions were small and mostly insignificant. 
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the deviation of the actual revisions from the diagnostic values was 
larger in the latter than in the former case. This implies that the pro- 
cessing of information concerning out-of-role behavior was less optimal 
or less accurate than the processing of information concerning in-role 
behavior. Though interesting, it is not entirely clear how these results 
should be interpreted theoretically. One possibility is that they are ar- 
tifactual. That is to say, the attitude favored by in-role behavior had a 
high prior probability, while the attitude favored by out-of-role behavior 
had a low prior probability; consequently, following the former behavior, 
observers had little room for revision and might have been reluctant to 
use the extreme probabilities justified by the diagnostic value (see Du- 
Charme, 1970). This analysis, however, does not account for the exces- 
sive revisions made in light of out-of-role behavior. Another alternative 
would suggest that observers gave little weight to prior trait probabili- 
ties, so that their posterior trait probabilities essentially reflected the 
diagnostic value of the behaviors (see Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). It 
follows that, if the prior probability of the attitude favored by the behav- 
ior is high (as in the case of in-role behavior), the revisions in light of this 
behavior should be conservative; and if the prior probability of the atti- 
tude favored by the behavior is low (as in the case of out-of-role behav- 
ior), the revisions in light of this behavior should be excessive. While 
compatible with the observed conservative revisions and excessive revi- 
sions made following in-role and out-of-role behaviors, respectively, this 
interpretation does not account for the fact that the latter were more 
pronounced than the former. More importantly, this interpretation (as 
well as the one mentioned earlier) does not account for the fact that the 
same pattern of deviations of actual revisions from diagnostic values was 
obtained in the moderate condition where the prior attitude probabilities 
were closer to 0.5 (particularly in the Arab school). Thus, although these 
results may be partly due to insensitivity to prior trait probabilities, it 
may be worthwhile to consider the possibility that they reflected assimi- 
lation and contrast effects (Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergall, 1965). That is to 
say, since in-role behavior requires a small change in the observer’s ini- 
tial opinion, it may fall within the observer’s latitude of acceptance and 
therefore, when actually observed, be assimilated to his initial expecta- 
tion. Hence, posterior odds would not be as distant from the prior odds 
as predicted by the behavior’s diagnostic value. Since an out-of-role act 
requires a large change in the observer’s expectations, it may fall within 
the observer’s lattitude of rejection. As a result, when such behavior is 
seen to occur, it may be subjected to a contrast effect, resulting in a 
greater displacement of the posterior odds from the prior odds than 
would be justified by the behavior’s diagnostic value (see Jones, Wor- 
chel, Goethals, & Grumet, 1971). In order for this analysis to fit the 
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data, it also has to be assumed that the distortion due to the contrast ef- 
fect was more pronounced than the distortion due to the assimilation ef- 
fect. 
The diagnostic values of role-relevant behaviors (arguing for or 
against Israel) were compared to those of role-neutral behaviors (arguing 
for or against the Common Market) in order to further illustrate the 
asymmetry involved in perception of the former. Contrary to our expec- 
tations, observers believed that what we considered role neutral behav- 
iors were in fact subject to external pressure and thus had in-role/out-of- 
role characteristics. This was manifested in a considerable difference 
between the diagnostic values of the two behaviors with regard to the 
Common Market issue. Fortunately, however, these differences were 
much more pronounced for the Israeli-Arab issue. In other words, 
although the actor’s stand on the Common Market was not devoid of ex- 
ternal pressure, the latter was less than that exerted on the actor 
regarding his stand on the Israeli-Arab conflict. Moreover, as antici- 
pated, the combined diagnostic values of our role-neutral acts were 
higher than those of our role-relevant acts. 
The effect of observing role-relevant behavior upon inferences from 
subsequent neutral behavior is a theoretical issue which deserves some 
amplification. Recall that the two actors argued in favor of the Common 
Market. However, one actor was previously seen engaging in in-role 
behavior while the other actor was seen engaging in out-of-role behavior 
with respect to the Israeli-Arab issue. One might well expect that a 
stronger attribution of a positive attitude toward the Common Market 
would be made to the latter than to the former actor. This seems to be 
consistent with Messick and Reeder’s (1972) suggestion that strength of 
inference from a behavior is mediated by the perceived trustworthiness 
of the actor or the likelihood that he will represent his true attitude. Ac- 
cording to these authors, an actor who engages in in-role behavior is per- 
ceived as less trustworthy than an actor who engages in out-of-role 
behavior. This raises the possibility that the previously established de- 
gree of trustworthiness will generalize to subsequent behaviors as well 
as to inferences drawn form such behaviors. Indeed, Messick and 
Reeder found that deceitful behavior by an actor diminished his trust- 
worthiness and, consequently, the strength of inference based on sub- 
sequent behaviors he might display. As reported earlier, the results of 
the present study only partially confirm these contentions. In all condi- 
tions, actual revisions in light of the role-neutral behavior were greater 
for the actor who previously engaged in out-of-role behavior than for the 
actor who previously engaged in in-role behavior. But the difference 
reached the conventional level of significance only in one of the condi- 
tions (the Arab school in the moderate condition). 
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A number of reasons can be offered for the weaker effect of pre- 
viously observed behavior in this study than in Messick and Reeder. 
The most obvious one is that the clear instance of deceit observed by 
Messick and Reeder’s subjects probably had a greater impact upon per- 
ceived trustworthiness than the corresponding information in this study, 
that is, in-role behavior. In any case, it is certainly important to test fur- 
ther Messick and Reeder’s proposition that “any factor which influences 
one’s perceived sincerity will mediate attributions made to that person 
on other dimensions” (p. 489). 
From a Bayesian standpoint, the mediating effect of the actor’s per- 
ceived sincerity on attitude inference should be reflected in the extent to 
which a behavior is more likely to be produced if the actor holds the 
appropriate attitude than if he does not hold the attitude. In other words, 
the established sincerity of an actor should be reflected in the diagnostic 
value of his behavior. If so, it would be interesting to find out how infor- 
mation about presently existing situational demands and past informa- 
tion about the actor’s behaviors combine to determine the diagnostic 
value of his currently observed behavior. 
In conclustion, the significance of the Bayesian probabilistic informa- 
tion processing framework is that it suggests a set of formal concepts- 
prior odds, posterior odds, diagnostic value, and actual revision- 
which identify measurable and manipulable aspects of the attribu- 
tion process. In this study, the application of these concepts to infer- 
ences from actors’ behaviors in situations involving social pressure per- 
mitted an explicit characterization of the various facets of the attribution 
process. The correlations between Bayesian diagnostic values and ob- 
servers’ actual revisions indicated that the Bayesian model can be quite 
useful in predicting observers inferences. That is to say, given the 
complexity of the information processed and the crudeness of the mea- 
surement instruments, these correlations, as well as similar ones reported 
by Ajzen (1971) and Trope (1974), although moderate, demon- 
strate that the Bayesian model is applicable to the process by which atti- 
tudes are inferred from behavior. 
REFERENCES 
Ajzen, I Attribution of a disposition to an actor: Effect of perceived decision freedom and 
behavioral utilities, Journal of Personalify and Social Psychology, 1971, 18, 149-156. 
Bern, D. An experimental analysis of self persuasion, Journal of Experimenfal Social Psy- 
chology, 1965,1, 199-218. 
DuCharme, W. M. A response bias explanation of conservative human inference. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology. 1970,&T, 66-74. 
Edwards, W., Phillips, L. D., Hays, W. L., & Goodman, B. C. Probabilistic information 
processing systems: Design and evaluation. IEEE Transaction OR System Science 
and Cybernetics. 1968, SSC-4, 248-265. 
458 TROPE AND BURNSTEIN 
Heider, F. The psychofogy of inferpersonal relations. New York: Wiley, 1958. 
Jones, E. E., & Davis, K. E. From acts to dispositions. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in 
experimental social psychology, Vol. 2. New York: Academic Press, 1965. Pp- 
219-266. 
Jones, E. E., Davis K. E., & Gergen, K. J. Role playing variations and their informational 
value for person perception. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1961, 63, 
307-3 10. 
Jones, E. E. & Gerard, H. B. Foundations ofsocial psychology. New York: Wiley, 1967. 
Jones, E. E., Worchel, S., Goethals, G. R., & Grumet, J. F. Prior expectancy and behav- 
ioral extremity as determinants of attitude attribution. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 197 117, 59-80. 
Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. On the psychology of prediction. Psychological Review, 
1973,80, 237-251. 
Katz, S., & Burnstein, E. Is an out-of-role act credibir to biased observers and does it 
affect the credibility of neural acts. 3 Unpublished manuscript. The University of 
Michigan, 1973. 
Kelley, H. H. Attribution theory in social psychology. In D. Levine (Ed.), Nebraska sym- 
posium on motivation. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971. 
Messick, D. M. Logical aspects of social inference. Paper presented at the Third Research 
Conference on Subjective Probability, Utility, and Decision Making. Brunel Univer- 
sity, Uxbridge, England, 1971. 
Messick, D. M., & Reeder, G. Perceived motivation, role variations, and the attribution of 
personal characteristics. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1972, 8, 
482-491. 
Peterson, C. R., Schneider, R. J., & Miller, A. J. Sample size and the revision of subjective 
probabilities. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1965,69, 522-527. 
Sherif, C. W., Sherif, M., & NebergalI, R. E. Attitude and attitude change: The social 
judgment-invotvement approach. Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, 1965. 
Thibaut, J. W., & Ricken, H. W. Some determinants and consequences of the perception 
of social causality. Journal of Personality. 1955,24, 113-133. 
Trope, Y. Inferential processes in the forced compliance situation: A Bayesian analysis. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1974,10, 1-16. 
Trope, Y. The informational values of behaviors and social situations: A Bayesian anaty- 
sis of attribution processes. Pater presented at the Forty-fifth Annual Meeting of the 
Midwestern Psychological Association. Chicago, Illinois, 1973. 
(Received April 16, 1974) 
